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Individuals often aim to reverse undesired outcomes in interactions with automated systems, like loan denials, by either implementing system-recommended actions (recourse), or manipulating their features. While providing recourse benefits users and enhances system utility, it also provides information about the decision process that can be used for more effective strategic manipulation, especially when the individuals collectively share such information with each other. We show that this tension leads rational utility-maximizing systems to frequently withhold recourse, resulting in decreased population utility, particularly impacting sensitive groups. To mitigate these effects, we explore the role of recourse subsidies, finding them effective in increasing the provision of recourse actions by rational systems, as well as lowering the potential social cost and mitigating unfairness caused by recourse withholding. 

Performative prediction, as introduced by Perdomo et al, is a framework for studying social prediction in which the data distribution itself changes in response to the deployment of a model. Existing work in this field usually hinges on three assumptions that are easily violated in practice: that the performative risk is convex over the deployed model, that the mapping from the model to the data distribution is known to the model designer in advance, and the first-order information of the performative risk is available. In this paper, we initiate the study of performative prediction problems that do not require these assumptions. Specifically, we develop a reparameterization framework that reparametrizes the performative prediction objective as a function of the induced data distribution. We then develop a two-level zeroth-order optimization procedure, where the first level performs iterative optimization on the distribution parameter space, and the second level learns the model that induces a particular target distribution at each iteration. Under mild conditions, this reparameterization allows us to transform the non-convex objective into a convex one and achieve provable regret guarantees. In particular, we provide a regret bound that is sublinear in the total number of performative samples taken and is only polynomial in the dimension of the model parameter. 

Given an algorithmic predictor that is accurate on some source population consisting of strategic human decision subjects, will it remain accurate if the population respond to it? In our setting, an agent or a user corresponds to a sample (X,Y) drawn from a distribution  and will face a model h and its classification result h(X). Agents can modify X to adapt to h, which will incur a distribution shift on (X,Y). Our formulation is motivated by applications where the deployed machine learning models are subjected to human agents, and will ultimately face responsive and interactive data distributions. We formalize the discussions of the transferability of a model by studying how the performance of the model trained on the available source distribution (data) would translate to the performance on its induced domain. We provide both upper bounds for the performance gap due to the induced domain shift, as well as lower bounds for the trade-offs that a classifier has to suffer on either the source training distribution or the induced target distribution. We provide further instantiated analysis for two popular domain adaptation settings, including covariate shift and target shift. 

The increasing automation of high-stakes decisions with direct impact on the lives and well-being of individuals raises a number of important considerations. Prominent among these is strategic behavior by individuals hoping to achieve a more desirable outcome. Two forms of such behavior are commonly studied: 1) misreporting of individual attributes, and 2) recourse, or actions that truly change such attributes. The former involves deception, and is inherently undesirable, whereas the latter may well be a desirable goal insofar as it changes true individual qualification. We study misreporting and recourse as strategic choices by individuals within a unified framework. In particular, we propose auditing as a means to incentivize recourse actions over attribute manipulation, and characterize optimal audit policies for two types of principals, utility-maximizing and recourse-maximizing. Additionally, we consider subsidies as an incentive for recourse over manipulation, and show that even a utility-maximizing principal would be willing to devote a considerable amount of audit budget to providing such subsidies. Finally, we consider the problem of optimizing fines for failed audits, and bound the total cost incurred by the population as a result of audits. 

The pursuit of long-term fairness involves the interplay between decision-making and the underlying data generating process. In this paper, through causal modeling with a directed acyclic graph (DAG) on the decision-distribution interplay, we investigate the possibility of achieving long-term fairness from a dynamic perspective. We propose Tier Balancing, a technically more challenging but more natural notion to achieve in the context of long-term, dynamic fairness analysis. Different from previous fairness notions that are defined purely on observed variables, our notion goes one step further, capturing behind-the-scenes situation changes on the unobserved latent causal factors that directly carry out the influence from the current decision to the future data distribution. Under the specified dynamics, we prove that in general one cannot achieve the long-term fairness goal only through one-step interventions. Furthermore, in the effort of approaching long-term fairness, we consider the mission of "getting closer to" the long-term fairness goal and present possibility and impossibility results accordingly.